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AND HOLMESIAN SOCIAL DARWINISM
Alexander Tsesis*
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
II. MARKETPLACE OF IDEAS FRAMEWORK . . . . . . . . . . .
III. CONSTRUCTIVE TRUTHS VS. DESTRUCTIVE
MESSAGES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
IV. TRUTH AND DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY . . . . . . . .
V. CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

495
496
503
508
510

I. INTRODUCTION

J

USTICE Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr.’s “marketplace of ideas” analogy continues to deeply influence First Amendment doctrine. It provides a rational substratum upon which the political or selfrealization characterizations of free speech are built. However, typically
overlooked is the Social Darwinistic root of the Justice’s thought. He
championed the spread of ideas and the political sway of majority opinions. That analytical insight is key to many of the Supreme Court’s free
speech precedents. On the one hand, the concept is invaluable for defending free discussions about philosophy, political science, the arts, humanities, pedagogy, and social sciences. In these areas, the marketplace
of thoughtful expression will give rise to searching wisdom, understanding, culture, taste, achievement, scientific truth, political action, and creativity. On the other hand, market political leverage can drown out
minority voices. According to a Holmesian relativist understanding, populist versions of truth can and should dominate law and its formation. To
his mind, the judiciary lacks any power to check “proletarian dictatorship” from forming in the country.1 Left unqualified, his political perspective on truth allows for abuses of representative governance. In the
second decade of the twenty-first century, democratic institutions are being exploited by populist autocrats like Hungary’s Viktor Orban or Turkey’s Recep Tayyip Erdogan. Populism in the United States, on the right
and on the left of the political spectrum, is alarmingly flirting with xenophobia, racism, and anti-Semitism. That political reality should give us
some pause about expecting libertarianism to yield a just truth.
* Raymond & Mary Simon Chair in Constitutional Law and Professor of Law,
Loyola University Chicago School of Law.
1. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 673 (1925) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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Justice Holmes’s Social Darwinistic approach to the marketplace of
ideas is fraught with callous notions of preference for powerful speakers.
It stands in opposition to a more equalitarian understanding of markets,
which recognizes the policy balance governments sometimes undertake to
advance important interests that protect open dialogue, while empowering indigent and powerless individuals to join the conversation.2 Truth
and falsity are manipulable concepts, not generally something courts
want to resolve. Falsehood is inevitable in conversation. At a minimum,
mistakes are rampant in discourse, therefore as New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan championed a “profound national commitment to the principle
that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wideopen.” 3 People living in a deliberative democracy must be given space to
joke, speak figuratively, and hyperbolically criticize government without
risk of censorship or punishment. Government lacks the authority to require parties to adopt its version of truth.4 This essay first provides a brief
doctrinal trajectory of how the Court developed its marketplace of ideas
doctrine. It then critiques the construct’s amenability to authoritarian
doctrines. At its core, this essay argues against the libertarian view of free
speech and for the adoption of a limited balancing test that, along with
precedents, requires judges to weigh speech, public policy, a means/ends
analysis, and the availability of less intrusive ways of achieving the narrowly tailored government aims.5
II. MARKETPLACE OF IDEAS FRAMEWORK
Justice Holmes first articulated the marketplace of ideas doctrine in his
1919 dissent to Abrams v. United States.6 He was not the first to come up
with that framework for reviewing speech restrictions, rather he relied on
John Stuart Mill’s7 and John Milton’s8 works. Neither was Abrams
Holmes’s first foray into free speech jurisprudence. Earlier the same year,
he had initiated the clear and present danger test into (what should be
said was really the creation of) modern First Amendment jurisprudence
2. See Genevieve Lakier, Imagining an Antisubordinating First Amendment, 118
COLUM. L. REV. 2117, 2127 (2018).
3. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
4. Totalitarian regimes equate official statements of truth with state policy and repress any views contrary to political dogma. For an excellent literary depiction of official
truth used to manipulate the ideas of citizens, see ARTHUR KOESTLER, DARKNESS AT
NOON 236–37 (Daphne Hardy trans., The Modern Library 1941) (expressing Soviet cynicism about the existence of any objective truth other than the totalitarian government’s
political definition of it).
5. I am borrowing the basic aspects of this standard from United States v. Alvarez, 567
U.S. 709, 730 (2012) (Breyer, J., concurring). In addition to the four balancing factors Justice Breyer lists, traditional and doctrinal reasons are also relevant to the exercise of judicial judgment.
6. 250 U.S. 616, 630–631 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
7. JOHN STUART MILL, UTILITARIANISM, LIBERTY AND REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT 105 (1957).
8. JOHN MILTON, AREOPAGITICA 58 (1918).
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in Schenck v. United States,9 Frohwerk v. United States,10 and Debs v.
United States.11 Those cases accepted that government can restrict speech
when it poses a clear and present danger to national security.
Consistent with those three cases, in Abrams, Holmes stated, “It is only
the present danger of immediate evil or an intent to bring it about that
warrants Congress in setting a limit to the expression of opinion where
private rights are not concerned.”12 Holmes’s dissent should be read contextually with the events that led to the conviction of a group of Russian
immigrants, who were sympathetic to the Bolshevik revolution in the Soviet Union. The five-person clique of Russian emigres living in New York
opposed sending U.S. troops into the U.S.S.R., urging “the persons to
whom it was addressed to turn a deaf ear to patriotic appeals in behalf of
the government of the United States, and to cease to render it assistance
in the prosecution of the war.”13 Holmes dissented to the conviction of
these small-time pamphleteers, who posed no clear and present danger to
the government, nor even to U.S. conscription.14 He believed, instead,
that government prosecuted Abrams and his co-publishers for their unpopular communist beliefs.15
Holmes’s statement of the marketplace of ideas is pithy:
[M]en . . . may come to believe even more than they believe the very
foundations of their own conduct that the ultimate good desired is
better reached by free trade in ideas—that the best test of truth is
the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of
the market, and that truth is the only ground upon which their wishes
safely can be carried out. That at any rate is the theory of our
Constitution.16
While this powerful statement is often cited and quoted, too rarely noticed in literature about his dissent to Abrams is the relativistic nature of
Holmes’s marketplace of ideas. He made its underlying cynicism clear in
a 1925 dissent to Gitlow v. New York: “If in the long run the beliefs expressed in proletarian dictatorship are destined to be accepted by the
dominant forces of the community, the only meaning of free speech is
that they should be given their chance and have their way.”17 Holmes
recognized that government can act against immediate threats to its continued existence; he thinks even the establishment of a “proletarian dictatorship” to be within the legitimate authority of the masses. Tragic
twentieth century examples of popular dictatorships that benefitted from
9. 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
10. 249 U.S. 204, 206 (1919).
11. 249 U.S. 211, 216 (1919).
12. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 628 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
13. Id. at 620–21 (majority opinion).
14. Id. at 628 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
15. Id. at 629–30. The Court has repeatedly ruled that there is a difference between
advocacy of abstract theories justifying the use of violence and actual preparations taken in
furtherance of such theories. See, e.g., Noto v. United States, 367 U.S. 290, 297–98 (1961).
16. Abrams, 250 U.S. at 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
17. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 673 (1925) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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charismatic orators—in Nazi Germany, Maoist China, Soviet Union, and
Khmer Rouge Cambodia—should give us pause about Holmes’s perfunctory assumption about truth being the eventual outcome of deliberative
discourse. In those historical cases, it was not the most reasonable groups
that ascended to power but the most ruthless, narrow-minded, and ideologically inflexible ones who established autocratic governments by the
power of their rhetoric. Truths about the equality of persons, civic representation, and fundamental rights did not win in the marketplace of ideas.
To the contrary, by their agitations against Jews, the bourgeois,
Vietnamese, and other class enemies, they set off campaigns of terror.
The marketplace of ideas is a philosophical ideal that does not always
lead to ideal results. Sometimes the arguments that best convince the
masses are also those that empower totalitarian regimes, who then shut
off debate once their ideas are calcified by ruling elites. While Holmes’s
formulation is utopian, the marketplace of ideas is really a neutral conduit for the forces of equality and those of oppression.
Holmes’s Gitlow dissent was not an anomaly in his thought but consistent with the relativistic philosophy expressed in his correspondence to
friends. Judge Richard Posner compares Holmes’s Social Darwinism to
Friedrich Nietzsche’s Übermensch morality, which advocates a complete
reevaluation of orthodox views about good and evil.18 Posner is right to
say that Holmes, like Nietzsche, thinks that “morality . . . is relative
rather than absolute.”19 This legal insight recognizes, against the dominant school of formalism in Holmes’s day, that law is driven by social
circumstances rather than abstract certainty. However, Posner’s analogy
is somewhat misleading: Holmes’s identification of political truth with the
“dominant forces of the community”20 differs markedly from Nietzsche’s
perspective of the Übermensch. The latter mocks herd mentality, championing instead an “independent intellect.”21 Holmes, on the other hand,
runs headlong into majoritarian relativism and mob rule.
Empowering dominant forces to impose truth heralds a political system
where the will of majority justifies the silencing of outsider voices. Independence of thought, to the contrary, allows for constitutional judgment
capable of checking abuses perpetrated against the minority. The prototype of judicial review is, in fact, built on this structure of independent
judgment based on constitutional norms, text, doctrines, structure, and
prudence.22 The premise behind reliance on heightened judicial scrutiny
to review suspect laws—those that intentionally target minorities, funda18. See Richard A. Posner, The Jurisprudence of Skepticism, 86 MICH. L. REV. 827,
885–86 (1988); see also FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, THUS SPOKE ZARATHUSTRA 101 (R.J. Hollingdale trans., Penguin Classics 1969) (1883–1885).
19. Posner, supra note 18, at 885.
20. Gitlow, 268 U.S. at 673 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
21. FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, BEYOND GOOD AND EVIL 111, 114 (Marianne Cowan
trans., Gateway ed. 1955) (1886).
22. For lexicographical modes of interpretation, see PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 12–13 (1991); Alexander Tsesis, Footholds of Constitutional Interpretation, 91 TEX. L. REV. 1593, 1594 (2013).
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mental rights, and democratic order—is that independent and impartial
judgment is needed to check the power of majorities to impose arbitrary
legal burdens.23 The evolution of American jurisprudence since the New
Deal has closely evaluated laws and their applications to prevent dominant strata of state and federal government from administering discriminatory legislative and executive fiat “against discrete and insular
minorities.”24 That counter-majoritarian methodology remains the fulcrum of contemporary strict and intermediate scrutiny cases, which courts
rely on to review whether authority disproportionately harms a suspect
class of people.
All this is to say that even the marketplace of ideas is not an unqualified analogy. It is rather a contextualizable framework that itself must be
tested by rational analysis consistent with existing tradition and doctrine
on matters requiring the balancing of speech, countervailing concerns,
mean/ends analyses, and alternative channels of communication.25
For Holmes, legal justifications were matters of the sovereign power to
compel or punish.26 Holmes’s legal majoritarianism and epistemic skepticism are philosophical vertebrae to his marketplace of ideas doctrine. As
one scholar put it, “Freedom of speech for Holmes is merely a concession
flowing from the sympathy of the authoritarian dominant.”27 Holmes understood truth to be “the road I can’t help travelling. What the worth of
that can’t help may be I have no means of knowing. Perhaps the universe,
if there is one, has no truth outside of the finiteness of man.”28 There are
as many truths as there are perceivers, and any attempt to articulate a
singular philosophical theory about them is bound to turn out fruitless.
For Holmes, the socially dominant strand of thought is, by definition, the
truthful thought. Moreover, according to Holmes’s Gitlow formula, those
whose ideas eclipse others’ in the marketplace of ideas acquire the right
to domineer politics, even to the point of imposing proletarian dictatorship upon the losers.
Professor Fredrick Schauer has pointed out that defining “moral truth
as what in fact survives” commits one “to saying that Nazism was ‘right’
in Germany in the 1930s, and that slavery was equally ‘correct’ or ‘wise’
in parts of the United States prior to the Civil War.”29 According to Jus23. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938).
24. Id.
25. The Court has relied on a similar self-evident rational reason. See, e.g., Engel v.
Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 424 (1962) (“There can, of course, be no doubt that . . . [a] program of
daily classroom invocation of God’s blessings as prescribed in the [state] Regents’ prayer is
a religious activity.”).
26. See Oliver Wendell Holmes, Natural Law, 32 HARV. L. REV. 40, 41 (1918) (“Deepseated preferences can not be argued about . . . and therefore, when differences are sufficiently far reaching, we try to kill the other man rather than let him have his way.”).
27. Francis E. Lucey, Holmes–Liberal–Humanitarian–Believer in Democracy?, 39
GEO. L.J. 523, 546 (1951).
28. Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to Lady Pollock (Oct. 27, 1901), in 1 HOLMESPOLLOCK LETTERS, 1874–1932, at 99–100 (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed., 1942) (emphasis in
original).
29. FREDERICK SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH: A PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY 21 (1982).

500

SMU LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 72

tice Frankfurter, Holmes’s “mind is scrupulously skeptical,” whereby “he
has escaped sterile dogma and romantic impressionism.”30 The philosopher James H. Tufts regards Holmes’s Social Darwinism to be a product
of skeptical thought that was common when evolutionary biology was still
in its youth.31 For Holmes, then, truth is an evolving social construct. That
perspective provides room for society to grow and not become stagnant
in a historical myopia, but it also leaves no compass for differentiating
popular tyranny from representative democracy.
Truth, Holmes believes, is identical to the dominant view of the crowd.
If they wish, the people can place constitutional limits on their government, but no universal truth of governance—nothing along the lines of
the Unalienable Rights Clause or Pursuit of Happiness Clause of the
Declaration of Independence—restrains the crowd from including provisions overtly discriminatory against discrete and insular minorities. The
exercise of law is justified by the majority’s “power to compel or punish.”32 The group holding onto the reins of power creates truths about
values—such as equality, justice, and the rule of law—in order to retain
politically privileged positions. Study of legal rights is helpful for predicting how courts are likely to decide cases and controversies, but the quest
for truth is ultimately an “empty substratum” defined by the public, not
some stable constitutional meaning.33 There is a short step between
Holmes’s perception of law as enforcement of power with no underlying
purpose and the notion that “might makes right.”34
In Holmes’s hands, marketplace philosophy does not recognize any
universal obligation to safeguard equal rights. What counts as legitimate
for him is the legal order imposed by rulers: “[T]he ultimate question is
what do the dominant forces of the community want and do they want it
hard enough to disregard whatever inhibitions may stand in the way.”35
According to this conception, deliberative democracy is not established
for identifying and shaping universal constitutional rights, enjoyed by
every member of the polity. To the contrary, even the right to live an
unmolested life is not an unconditional good that must be protected by
society; rather, the right to life is a discretionary “privilege granted . . . by
30. Felix Frankfurter, The Early Writings of O. W. Holmes, Jr., 44 HARV. L. REV. 717,
723–24 (1931).
31. See James H. Tufts, Legal and Social Philosophy of Mr. Justice Holmes, 7 A.B.A. J.
359, 359 (1921).
32. Am. Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 356 (1909) (“Law is a statement
of the circumstances in which the public force will be brought to bear upon men through
the courts.”); Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Law Magazine and Review, 6 AM. L. REV. 593
(1872) (book review), reprinted in 44 HARV. L. REV. 788, 788 (1931).
33. Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to Frederick Pollock (Jan. 19, 1928), in 2
HOLMES-POLLOCK LETTERS, 1874–1931, at 212 (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed., 1942).
34. See John C. Ford, The Fundamentals of Holmes’ Juristic Philosophy, 11 FORDHAM
L. REV. 255, 257 (1942).
35. Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to John Wu (Aug. 26, 1926), in OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES: HIS BOOK NOTICES AND UNCOLLECTED LETTERS AND PAPERS 187 (Harry
C. Shriver ed., 1936).
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the state.”36 As Holmes put it, “[T]he sacredness of human life is a purely
municipal ideal of no validity outside the jurisdiction.”37 According to
this perspective, majoritarian government determines whether human
lives should be preserved and, if so, whose lives deserve the protection of
laws. In fact, a state, by virtue of its public power to legislate, can discriminate against such groups as the mentally handicapped,38 since after all
Holmes thinks human life is not intrinsically valuable. Laws are malleable
but enforceable customs which are posited on society by the will of the
dominant (i.e., ruling) group.39 As individuals living in a society, humans
may have a personal interest to protect their lives, but the sovereign can
take away that life and not respect their dignity: “I don’t believe that it is
an absolute principle or even a human ultimate that man always is an end
in himself—that his dignity must be respected, etc. We march up a conscript with bayonets behind to die for a cause he doesn’t believe in.”40
Holmes chucks deontological reasoning for Social Darwinism. In his populist social morality, legal protections are available to outgroups at the
behest of those who are then in power, their will, and their categorical
dictates. The “proletarian dictatorship” Holmes refers to in his 1925 opinion presumably involves only a small clique of political operatives, as was
the case in the Soviet Union under Lenin and Stalin. In order to further
its purposes and cosmology, the sovereign may unscrupulously sacrifice
whosoever’s lives it sees fit:
The most fundamental of the supposed preexisting rights—the right
to life—is sacrificed without a scruple not only in war, but whenever
the interest of society, that is, of the predominant power in the community, is thought to demand it. Whether that interest is the interest
of mankind in the long run no one can tell.41
Holmes’s perspective on the relative value of life is tied into the power of
populism. Around the globe today we see just this form of populism exploiting the instruments of democratic structures, including elections, to
gain control and exercise authoritarian rule with a charismatic leader, like
Prime Minister Viktor Orbán in Hungary or President Andrzej Duda in
Poland, at the helms of their respective governments. 42
All this philosophical background puts into context Holmes’s marketplace of ideas doctrine, found in his dissent to Abrams. Clearly, he does
36. Lucey, supra note 27, at 534.
37. Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to Frederick Pollock (Jan. 19, 1928), supra
note 33, at 36.
38. See Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927).
39. See Ben W. Palmer, Hobbes, Holmes and Hitler, 31 A.B.A. J. 569, 571 (1945).
40. Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to John Wu (Aug. 26, 1926), supra note 35, at
187.
41. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, Natural Law, in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 310, 314
(1920).
42. See Sujit Choudhry, Will Democracy Die in Darkness?, in CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY IN CRISIS? 571, 574–77 (Mark A. Graber, Sanford Levinson & Mark Tushnet
eds., 2018); Sam Issacharoff, Populism Versus Democratic Governance, in CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY IN CRISIS?, supra, at 445, 446, 450; Wojciech Sadurski, Constitutional
Crisis in Poland, in CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY IN CRISIS?, supra, at 257, 257–60.
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not mean that speech will inevitably yield representative democracy. In
fact, he’s skeptical of any truth about good government, much less that
speech will bring it about. Rather, for him the marketplace of ideas could
just as easily yield totalitarianism as it could deliberative democracy.
Holmes’s perspective on the “free trade of ideas” being “the best test
of truth,” therefore, represents the position that dominant forces can impose their notion of truth on minority populations. Holmes is unclear
about the extent to which the community that identifies truth should be
local, statewide, or national. His disinterest in the rights of minorities
rears its head in two of the cases that established First Amendment jurisprudence: Schenck and Frohwerk.43 In both, he applied the newly minted
clear and present danger test to uphold convictions against persons with
little influence, who were opposed to U.S. involvement in World War I,
but certainly posed no danger to the national, state, or local governments.44 Nowhere in his judicial writings or personal correspondences did
he second-guess those conclusions.
Outside the First Amendment field, Holmes’s moral relativism is evident from Buck v. Bell, where he wrote the majority upholding the state
sterilization of a woman crassly classified as an “imbecile.”45 That label—
along with “feeble minded,” “idiots,” “imbeciles,” and “morons”—was a
common degradation leveled at the turn of the twentieth century against
persons deemed to be mentally ill.46 Holmes also upheld the dominant,
racist faction opinion in Alabama—upholding state disenfranchisement
of black voters.47 Disenfranchisement was the will of the dominant forces
of the state, and Holmes in Giles v. Teasley upheld it. Put another way, he
entangled the Court in suppressing the votes of almost all blacks and illiterate whites living there.48 Holmes’s Social Darwinism is analytically suspect because its relativistic acceptance of majoritarian truth poses a threat
to politically underrepresented groups.49
While the marketplace of ideas assumes that “uninhibited, robust, and
wide open” speech will enrich public dialogue, that is not always the case.
43. See Alexander Tsesis, Burning Crosses on Campus: University Hate Speech Codes,
43 CONN. L. REV. 617, 625–26 (2010).
44. See Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U.S. 204, 207–08 (1919); Kent Greenawalt,
Free Speech in the United States and Canada, 55 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 5, 11 (1992);
Frederick M. Lawrence, The Collision of Rights in Violence-Conducive Speech, 19 CARDOZO L. REV. 1333, 1340 (1998).
45. Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927).
46. MARTHA A. FIELD & VALERIE A. SANCHEZ, EQUAL TREATMENT FOR PEOPLE
WITH MENTAL RETARDATION 36 (1999). For an example of twentieth century popular perceptions, see Training School for Mental Defectives Established, 1919 Ga. Laws 377, 379;
MARTIN W. BARR, MENTAL DEFECTIVES: THEIR HISTORY, TREATMENT AND TRAINING
99–100 (1904).
47. Giles v. Teasley, 193 U.S. 146, 166–67 (1904); Giles v. Harris, 189 U.S. 475, 486–88
(1903).
48. ALEXANDER TSESIS, WE SHALL OVERCOME: A HISTORY OF CIVIL RIGHTS AND
THE LAW 139–41 (2008).
49. See OWEN M. FISS, TROUBLED BEGINNINGS OF THE MODERN STATE, 1888–1910,
at 372–79 (1993); LOUIS MENAND, THE METAPHYSICAL CLUB: A STORY OF IDEAS IN
AMERICA 66 (2001).
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In many circumstances, powerful actors often control expressive resources.50 They use financial clout to dominate media outlets not as easily
available to the average citizen and not always given to veridical expression. 51
Instead of solely trusting in the marketplace for beneficial effects, the
Court should examine whether a proper balance has been struck between
the needs for public debate, security, anti-discrimination policy, and general welfare considerations. These are not simple matters to evaluate in
the course of litigation, but a sophisticated judicial analysis and justified
reasoning is needed. The marketplace of ideas model is neutral about the
use of financial resources, political influence, and market standing to so
dominate the speech markets as to silent minority, heterodox voices.
Where more than one fundamental value of the Constitution is at stake in
litigation, free expression should not be an automatic trump.
III. CONSTRUCTIVE TRUTHS VS. DESTRUCTIVE MESSAGES
Truly threatening and inciteful messages add no truth to the marketplace of ideas, even when they pose no imminent threat of harm. And a
Social Darwanistic approach to judicial interpretation risks undermining
democratic rule. Misethnic speakers draw upon public opinion and shape
it in the direction of greater fear, disrespect, dehumanization, and hatred
of outgroups. As the great psychiatrist of prejudice, Gordon Allport, put
it decades ago,
Although most barking (antilocution) does not lead to biting, yet
there is never a bite without previous barking. Fully seventy years of
political anti-Semitism of the verbal order preceded the discriminatory Nürnberg Laws passed by the Hitler regime. Soon after these
Laws were passed the violent program of extermination began. Here
we see the not infrequent progression: antilocution → discrimination
→ . . . violence.52
Too many examples can be drawn to demonstrate Allport’s powerful insight into how demagogues exploit historical prejudices to instigate violence. The growth of alt-right racism in the United States, supporting
Donald Trump, and left wing anti-Semitic populism, favored by the leaders of the Women’s March and Black Lives Matter movements, has increased racial and ethnic tension and, worse yet, hate crimes around the
country. 53 Just like shouting “fire” in a crowded movie theater, which can
50. Owen M. Fiss, Free Speech and Social Structure, 71 IOWA L. REV. 1405, 1407
(1986).
51. See id. at 1410–11, 1414.
52. GORDON W. ALLPORT, THE NATURE OF PREJUDICE 57 (1954).
53. See 2017 Hate Crime Statistics: Incidents, Offenses, Victims, and Known Offenders
by Bias Motivation, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, https://ucr.fbi.gov/hate-crime/2017/
tables/table-1.xls [https://perma.cc/CW8K-C6CJ] (last visited Mar. 15, 2019); Joe Concha,
Meghan McCain Presses Women’s March Co-President Over Farrakhan Remarks, HILL
(Jan. 14, 2019), https://thehill.com/homenews/media/425265-meghan-mccain-presses-wo
mens-march-president-over-association-with-farrakhan [https://perma.cc/NU35-JMY6];
Hamid Dabashi, Black Lives Matter and Palestine: A Historic Alliance, AL JAZEERA (Sept.
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be prohibited without violating the First Amendment,54 misethnic speech
can cause a stampede. More precisely, destructive messages can instigate
pogroms, lynchings, internments, disenfranchisement, and, in the worst
cases, even genocide. A few historical examples will help to make the
point.
The Inquisition in Spain long spread propaganda and instigated the
popular movement culminating in the expulsion of the Jews in 1492.55
Priestly zealots like Vincent Ferrer, a Dominican monk whom the Roman
Catholic Church later canonized, raised nationwide anti-Jewish hysteria
during the late fifteenth century.56 Ferrer stirred the population against
Jews by first demanding their forced conversion and then retaliation for
those who failed to heed his commands.57 Repercussions of his teachings
were by no means benign. His advocacy led to the issuing of a Castilian
decree that discriminated against Jews in the spheres of employment,
dress, and criminal punishment.58 The great German historian Heinrich
Graetz describes the connection between anti-Jewish preaching and draconian edicts: violent assaults on the Jews were “inflamed by the passionate eloquence of the preacher.”59 In addition to Graetz’s explanation,
6, 2016), https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2016/09/black-lives-matter-palestinehistoric-alliance-160906074912307.html [https://perma.cc/87PZ-WMQP]; Alan M. Dershowitz, Black Lives Matter Must Rescind Anti-Israel Declaration, BOS. GLOBE (Aug. 12,
2016), https://www.bostonglobe.com/opinion/columns/2016/08/12/black-lives-matter-mustrescind-anti-israel-declaration/EHDYV3gNLwrTTwfp0JA8QN/story.html [https://
perma.cc/B76Q-KU3X]; Griffin Edwards & Stephen Rushin, The Effect of President
Trump’s Election on Hate Crimes, SSRN (Jan. 14, 2018), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/pa
pers.cfm?abstract_id=3102652 [https://perma.cc/8P3R-Z5U2]; Leah McSweeney & Jacob
Siegel, Is the Women’s March Melting Down?, TABLET (Dec. 10, 2018), https://www.tablet
mag.com/jewish-news-and-politics/276694/is-the-womens-march-melting-down [https://
perma.cc/DL9U-RWBQ]; Brendan Skwire, Meghan McCain Corners Women’s March Organizer Tamika Mallory Over Her Praise of Louis Farrakhan, SALON (Jan. 15, 2019), https:/
/www.salon.com/2019/01/14/meghan-mccain-corners-womens-march-organizer-tamika-mal
lory-over-her-praise-of-louis-farrakhan_partner/ [https://perma.cc/5S2K-K8VD]; Marc A.
Thiessen, Trump’s Failure to Condemn the Bigots of the Alt-Right Tars His Presidency,
WASH. POST (Aug. 14, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/trumps-failure-tocondemn-the-bigots-of-the-alt-right-tars-his-presidency/2018/08/14/6f076fee-9fe2-11e8-8e8
7-c869fe70a721_story.html?utm_term-.f8764b554fed [https://perma.cc/TAN2-47X3]; Chloe
Valdary, Black Lives Matter’s Jewish Problem Is Also a Black Problem, TABLET (Aug. 4.
2016), https://www.tabletmag.com/jewish-news-and-politics/209977/black-lives-matters-jewish-problem [https://perma.cc/6LN4-DZZ9]; Bari Weiss, Ilhan Omar and the Myth of Jewish Hypnosis, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 21, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/21/opinion/
ilhan-omar-israel-jews.html [https://perma.cc/96BV-ZWEP].
54. Schenck, 249 U.S. at 52 (“The most stringent protection of free speech would not
protect a man in falsely shouting fire in a theatre and causing a panic.”).
55. BEN KIERNAN, BLOOD AND SOIL: A WORLD HISTORY OF GENOCIDE AND EXTERMINATION FROM SPARTA TO DARFUR 70 (2007).
56. See JAMES M. ANDERSON, DAILY LIFE DURING THE SPANISH INQUISITION 92
(2002); 4 HEINRICH GRAETZ, HISTORY OF THE JEWS 200–06 (1894); FREDERIC DAVID MOCATTA, THE JEWS OF SPAIN AND PORTUGAL AND THE INQUISITION 20–21 (1877); JOSEPH
PÉREZ, THE SPANISH INQUISITION: A HISTORY 9–12 (Janet Lloyd trans., 2005); GRETCHEN
D. STARR-LEBEAU, IN THE SHADOW OF THE VIRGIN: INQUISITORS, FRIARS, AND CONVERSOS IN GUADALUPE, SPAIN 37–38 (2003).
57. MIRI RUBIN, GENTILE TALES: THE NARRATIVE ASSAULT ON LATE MEDIEVAL
JEWS 128 (1999).
58. ANDERSON, supra note 56, at 92.
59. GRAETZ, supra note 56, at 204–05.
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another historian writes:
For centuries, Christians had been encouraged to hate the Jews. With
preachers telling them, Sunday after Sunday, that Jews were perverted and guilty of complicity in the death of Christ, the faithful
ended up by detesting them with a hatred that was bound one day to
express itself in violence.60
From the verbal harassment Jews suffered during the Inquisition, Jewish
expulsion from Spain during Ferdinand and Isabella’s regal rein followed
naturally from centuries of verbal degradation. By no means was this injustice accomplished in an expressive vacuum. The ideological floor for
injustice was set by centuries of verbal abuses.61
Forced conversion, mass violence, exclusion from public office,
mandatory ghettos, restrictions on professions, and prohibitions against
mingling with Christians followed from the repeated spread of verbal hatred during the Inquisition. The economic consequences on Spain were
ruinous, as many Jews fled to North Africa, Portugal, and Palestine.
“Spain lost an incalculable treasure by the exodus of Jewish . . .
merchants, craftsmen, scholars, physicians, and scientists, and the nations
that received them benefitted economically and intellectually.”62 Many
other ethnic groups have likewise suffered from long-term verbal
degradations.
The danger of today comes from the far right who are led by charismatic leaders, like David Duke and Louis Farrakhan, and from the far
left whose charismatic leaders include Linda Sarsour and Tamika Murray,
who welcome anti-Semites into their movements.63 While the United
States remains a safe haven, without the mass killings of hot spots like
Syria or the Democratic Republic of the Congo, it would be naive, especially after Donald Trump’s Electoral College victory with the support of
the Ku Klux Klan and the American Nazi Party, to believe that hate
groups could not capture the attention of the electorate through racial
incitement and xenophobia. With no limits to the marketplace of ideas,
parties and politicians can harness age-old stereotypes to achieve political
victories.
Understanding the risks of nefarious political capture, Germany and
other countries prohibit anti-democratic parties from forming and run60. PÉREZ, supra note 56, at 9.
61. MARVIN PERRY & FREDERICK M. SCHWEITZER, ANTISEMITISM: MYTH AND HATE
FROM ANTIQUITY TO THE PRESENT 128 (2002).
62. 6 WILL DURANT, THE STORY OF CIVILIZATION 220 (1957). Durant also writes of
Spain’s economic losses from expelling Muslims from Castile and León. See id.
63. See Richard Cohen, Why Does the Left Still Associate with Louis Farrakhan?,
WASH. POST (Jan. 21, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/why-does-the-leftstill-associate-with-louis-farrakhan/2019/01/21/de47f966-1db7-11e9-9145-3f74070bbdb9_
story.html?utm_term=.ae4cf5cc1c7d [https://perma.cc/M7B4-YDW5]; Deroy Murdock,
Farrakhan Awash in Federal Dollars, Anti-Semitic Hate Notwithstanding, FOX NEWS (Dec.
26, 2018), https://www.foxnews.com/opinion/farrakhan-awash-in-federal-dollars-anti-semit
ic-hate-notwithstanding [https://perma.cc/7SDU-X2LX].
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ning in elections.64 Algeria recognizes the right of people to use the marketplace of ideas to organize political parties but prohibits them from
violating fundamental values or the people’s sovereign authority to safeguard “the democratic and republican nature of the State.”65 These countries have determined that maintaining representative democracies is of
greater moment than securing a libertarian marketplace of ideas, especially one tainted by Social Darwinistic undertones.
In some of the worst crimes against humanity, hate speech has incited
brutality against minorities inadequately protected through ordinary political processes. As I’ve detailed elsewhere, in the United States misethnic speech has been used to justify the enslavement of blacks and
aborigines.66 Around the globe, mass slaughter has followed extensive,
dehumanizing campaigns that drew from and stirred nativist, racialist,
bigoted, and otherwise exclusionary rhetoric.67 The historian Ben
Kiernan documents how dehumanizing narratives preceded, spread, and
influenced massacres against segments of the indigenous Irish, Northern
and Southern America natives, and Australian aboriginal populations.68
Throughout the modern world, ethnocentrism and racism have also
sparked violence through widely disseminated incitements in tribal
clashes in Kenya.69 Some of the most heinous examples of how media
broadcasting of ethnic stereotyping coupled with abstract calls for violence can lead to extreme violence occurred in Rwanda prior to the 1994

64. GRUNDGESETZ [GG] [BASIC LAW] art. 21, translation at http://www.gesetze-im-in
ternet.de/englisch_gg/index.html [https://perma.cc/HW5U-6UMK].
65. CONSTITUTION OF THE PEOPLE’S DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF ALGERIA 1989
(amended 1996), art. 42, available at http://confinder.richmond.edu/admin/docs/local_alger
ia.pdf [https://perma.cc/RUR7-G7HR] (“The right to create political parties is recognized
and guaranteed. However, this right cannot be used to violate the fundamental liberties,
the fundamental values and components of the national identity, the national unity, the
security and integrity of the national territory, the independence of the country and the
People’s sovereignty as well as the democratic and republican nature of the State.”).
66. See ALAN GALLAY, THE INDIAN SLAVE TRADE: THE RISE OF THE ENGLISH EMPIRE IN THE AMERICAN SOUTH, 1670–1717, at 294 (2002); ALEXANDER TSESIS, DESTRUCTIVE MESSAGES: HOW HATE SPEECH PAVES THE WAY FOR HARMFUL SOCIAL
MOVEMENTS 28–29 (2002); DAVID J. WEBER, THE SPANISH FRONTIER IN NORTH AMERICA
127–28 (1992).
67. See DAVID BRION DAVIS, THE PROBLEM OF SLAVERY IN THE AGE OF EMANCIPATION 16–17 (2014) (“There is actually a long history to the links between animalization and
genocide or ethnic cleansing, and the formula by no means ended with the Nazis [attempt
to commit genocide against the Jews]. In 1994, when the Hutu slaughtered some 800,000
Tutsi neighbors in Rwanda, the victims were repeatedly likened to inyenizi, or cockroaches.”). This is an example I shared with Davis during an extensive email exchange.
68. KIERNAN, supra note 55, at 77–100, 187–212, 219–48, 252, 276–309.
69. See BINAIFER NOWROJEE, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, FAILING THE INTERNALLY
DISPLACED: THE UNDP DISPLACED PERSONS PROGRAM IN KENYA 61–63 (1997); JOHN O.
OUCHO, UNDERCURRENTS OF ETHNIC CONFLICT IN KENYA 90 (2002); Kwamboka Oyaro,
KENYA: The Media Is Not Innocent, INTER PRESS SERV. (Feb. 2, 2008), http://
www.ipsnews.net/2008/02/kenya-the-media-is-not-innocent/ [https://perma.cc/2ZEHB4DP]; Ofeibea Quist-Arcton, Tracing the Roots of Ethnic Violence in Kenya, NAT’L PUB.
RADIO (Jan. 31, 2008), https://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=18582319
[https://perma.cc/3R3Q-GSYW ].
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genocide perpetrated by the Hutus against the Tutsis.70
The government of Sudan has supported and participated in racial hate
propaganda spread by Jingaweid (Arab) militias against black Africans
living in Darfur.71 The government in the Democratic Republic of the
Congo has relied on ethnic hatred to incite militias to perpetrate ethnic
violence.72 Publications filled with dehumanization, bigotry, and antiSemitism fill Arab newspapers, inspiring terrorist groups like the Hamas
and Hizballah to freely operate and fund violent operations. In Saudi
Arabia, the government and its supported Wahhabi sect produces and
writes textbooks that teach children that killing Jews and hating Christians is the way to true Muslim piety.73
Organizations and individuals who benefit politically or personally
from incitement, threat, and harassment often adopt misethnic rhetoric
that appeals to community prejudices. In his dissent to Gitlow, Holmes
defends the legitimacy of political campaigns that bring populist autocrats
to power. Once they are installed, popular dictatorships shut down opposition and, as in Russia under the Bolsheviks or Turkey under the Justice
and Development Party, stymy democratic participation. Missing from
his account of populist rhetoric is any proportional context of how inflammatory speech can spark discrimination and violence. The instigators of
racial, ethnic, nationalistic, and religious intolerance have relied on various forms of propaganda to influence conduct by unsound, clearly erroneous, and dehumanizing views, ideologies, and instigations.
This raises the question of how to determine whether governmental
authority can be brought to bear on misethnic speech intentionally calling
on followers to commit atrocities. Rather than figuring out how likely it is
that speech will cause an imminent harm, as Brandenburg requires of
judges, a more nuanced analysis is needed to transcend the deficiencies of
70. ANTHONY CORTESE, OPPOSING HATE SPEECH 45–46 (2006); CHARITY KAGWINDUNGU, THE CHALLENGES IN PROSECUTING PRINT MEDIA FOR INCITEMENT TO GENOCIDE, in THE MEDIA AND THE RWANDA GENOCIDE 330, 339–40 (Allan Thompson ed.,
2007).
71. See BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, H.R. & LAB., U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, SUDAN: ETHNIC CLEANSING IN DARFUR (Apr. 27, 2004), https://2001-2009.state.gov/g/drl/rls/31822.htm
[https://perma.cc/QYK7-887S]; BRIAN STEIDLE & GRETCHEN STEIDLE WALLACE, THE
DEVIL CAME ON HORSEBACK: BEARING WITNESS TO THE GENOCIDE IN DARFUR xvii
(2007); Mahgoub El-Tigani Mahmoud, Inside Darfur: Ethnic Genocide by a Governance
Crisis, 24 COMP. STUD. S. ASIA, AFR. & MIDDLE E., Nov. 2, 2004, at 3.
72. See CHRISTIAN P. SCHERRER, GENOCIDE AND CRISIS IN CENTRAL AFRICA: CONFLICT ROOTS, MASS VIOLENCE, AND REGIONAL WAR 283 (2002); HRW Alarmed About
Hate Radio Broadcasts and the Incitement of Ethnic Violence in the DRC, HUMAN RIGHTS
WATCH (Aug. 12, 1998), https://www.hrw.org/news/1998/08/12/hrw-alarmed-about-hate-radio-broadcasts-and-incitement-ethnic-violence-drc [https://perma.cc/78CX-P3BM];
Hannah Summers, Democratic Republic of Congo: 250 Killed in ‘Ethnic’ Massacres, Says
UN, GUARDIAN (Aug. 5, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2017/
aug/05/democratic-republic-of-congo-250-killed-in-ethnic-massacres-says-un [https://
perma.cc/HP66-7BT5].
73. See Anne Applebaum, The Saudi Guide to Piety, WASH. POST (July 22, 2008),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/07/21/AR2008072102357.html
[https://perma.cc/4LTN-EA49].
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Holmes’s Social Darwinistic version of the marketplace of ideas.74 How
likely racial, ethnic, and religious hatred is to stir up violent or anti-democratic conduct is a contextual question needing analysis of the speaker’s
interests, including the circumstances under which the statement was
made; countervailing public concerns to advance, maintain, and safeguard
representative governance committed to liberty, equality, and the general
welfare; fit between government action and the end sought; the notoriety
of the speaker; and whether there are less restrictive means for the government to achieve its intent.
IV. TRUTH AND DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY
The search for constitutional truth logically involves at least the freedom to exchange views, to criticize, to ideate, and to emote. These are
content-based preferences of deliberative democracy. The First Amendment marketplace of ideas is critical for the preservation of those substantive values. Free exchange of idea is necessary to just governance
predicated on reasonable policies, statutes, regulations, and executive orders. Prudence should be exercised, not categorical cheerleading of all
speech, totalitarian and egalitarian alike. Holmes’s version of the marketplace of ideas is not utilitarian, as was John Stuart Mill’s earlier use of the
analogy. Even Mill recognized that “the dictum that truth always triumphs over persecution, is one of those pleasant falsehoods which men
repeat after one another till they pass into commonplaces, but which all
experience refutes. History teems with instances of truth put down by
persecution.”75 Moreover, as the great American free speech theorist Alexander Meiklejohn explained it, the “marketplace of ideas” doctrine is
unhelpful in assessing the differences between right and wrong, as well as
the differences between true and false.76
As we saw in Part III, time and again hate speech has been crucial for
catalyzing misethnic harms. Even democratic institutions can be exploited
to bring a violent minority to power or to harness the prejudice of the
people into collective violent acts, including mobocracy.
The First Amendment is not a shield for intentionally violent and genocidal rhetoric. Governance that caves into the Holmesian proletarian dictatorship version of truth77 undercuts pluralism and governance for the
happiness and safety of free and equal persons. There are limits to free
speech. The difficult question for courts, however, is how to determine
whether group animus will likely instigate state or vigilante harms against
identifiable groups.
74. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (per curiam).
75. JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 89 (Pelican Classics 1980) (1859).
76. ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT 87 (1948).
77. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 673 (1925) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (“If in the
long run the beliefs expressed in proletarian dictatorship are destined to be accepted by the
dominant forces of the community, the only meaning of free speech is that they should be
given their chance and have their way.”).
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This essay argues that the delegation model of democracy signaled by
Justice Holmes leans too strongly to majoritarian public opinion.
Majoritarian democracy can be manipulated by anti-egalitarian parties.78
We see that today throughout the world, where democracies have been
manipulated by autocratic forces, as in Venezuela, Turkey, the United
States, and Poland. Even autocracies, such as North Korea, Cameroon,
Zimbabwe, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, use elections—
albeit with rigged results.
The U.S. Supreme Court’s libertarian doctrine on campaign financing
poses a challenge to deliberative democracy, allowing plutocratic and oligarchic influences (corporate and private) to gain significantly more access than the average citizen to public officials by contributing to
campaigns or expending their own money to promote special interest issues.79 This political preference for the wealthy in the United States
threatens to undermine orderly, fair, and representative elections and to
increase the appearance of corruption and, in some cases, even actual
corruption.
Warnings of the dangers associated with majoritarian abuses of power
are found in the political philosophy of James Madison, who opposed factional cabals in Federalist No. 10. In that tract, he explained the need to
“refine and enlarge the public views, by passing them through the medium of a chosen body of citizens, whose wisdom may best discern the
true interest of their country, and whose patriotism and love of justice,
will be least likely to sacrifice it to temporary or partial considerations.”80
Representative deliberation, at least in theory, seeks policy solutions that
achieve the public good for all segments of the population rather than
automatic preferences that emerge in the marketplace of ideas. A representative government, as Madison went on to say, may better pronounce
the public voice “by the representatives of the people . . . than if pronounced by the people themselves convened for the purpose.”81 Factions,
on other hand, can betray the interests of the people’s general welfare.82
As Madison explained in Federalist No. 51,
In the extended republic of the United States, and among the great
variety of interests, parties and sects which it embraces, a coalition of
a majority of the whole society could seldom take place on any other
principles than those of justice and the general good . . . by introducing into the government . . . a will independent of the society itself.83
78. More than two millennia ago, Plato described in the Republic how demagogues
pursuing autocratic rule manipulate democratic institutions and gain control through factional politics. 1 PLATO, THE REPUBLIC, in THE DIALOGUES OF PLATO 820–24 (B. Jowett
trans., 1937).
79. Ganesh Sitaraman, Economic Inequality and Constitutional Democracy, in CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY IN CRISIS?, supra note 42, at 537–38.
80. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 62 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 352–53 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
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To Madison’s account, we may add that the “general good” should be
understood to be a social condition where each individual is treated with
equal dignity.
The bounds of democracy, then, are representation and justice, with
liberal equality for the common good being essential to establish a reasonably ordered self-governing polity. Now what the bounds of liberal
equality are is always a matter of contestation. The marketplace of ideas
provides a forum for sorting out ideas, but the dominant forces of the
community should not define truth. An analysis of the matter at stake is
difficult in decisions pitting government against private interests, but answers need not be along Holmes’s Social Darwinistic model. They should
not, for example, allow neo-Nazi rallies to proceed, where there is a reasonable likelihood of violence as occurred during the violent neo-Nazi
and alt-right rally in Charlottesville, Virginia, in the summer of 2017
where participants chanted, “The Jews will not replace us!”84
The task of free speech theory is to articulate the conditions for robust
debate, cathartic expression, and informative communication, while defining narrowly tailored regulations that punish linguistic conduct that is
intentionally threatening to individuals and groups or inciting of others to
harm them. Free speech commands a special place in a deliberative democracy because it allows each person, no matter how powerful or renowned, to participate in discussions about polity, personal taste, and
feelings. Yet some balance must be made to provide the state with legitimate control and the liberty interests of the individual. That scale is one
Justice Breyer has advocated in concurrence, weighing the rights of the
speaker against countervailing policy interests, means/ends fit, and alternative avenues of communication.85
V. CONCLUSION
Speech that causes harm, including workplace and educational harassment,86 can be limited without violating the First Amendment. Legitimate justifications for coercive laws can work against majoritarian
interests, preventing harms even when such measures are unpopular with
the electorate. The marketplace of ideas is not absolutely determinative;
to the contrary, it must be tied to the fundamental ethos of the Constitution requiring general welfare through safeguards of freedom and equal84. See Emma Green, Why the Charlottesville Marchers Were Obsessed with Jews, AT(Aug. 15, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/08/nazis-racismcharlottesville/536928/ [https://perma.cc/6JYE-BSCS]; Joe Heim, Recounting a Day of
Rage, Hate, Violence and Death, WASH. POST (Aug. 14, 2017), https://www.washing
tonpost.com/graphics/2017/local/charlottesville-timeline [https://perma.cc/X497-F7W5];
What Charlottesville Changed, POLITICO MAG. (Aug. 12, 2018), https://www.politico.com/
magazine/story/2018/08/12/charlottesville-anniversary-supremacists-protests-dc-virginia219353 [https://perma.cc/W8SR-A27K].
85. See United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 730 (2012) (Breyer, J., concurring);
ALEXANDER TSESIS, CONTEXTUALIZING FREE SPEECH (forthcoming 2020).
86. See Civil Rights Act of 1964 tit. VI, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d–2000d-7 (2012); Civil
Rights Act of 1964 tit. VII, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e–2000e-17 (2012).
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ity. Free speech theory, then, need not be libertarian—and certainly not
Social Darwinism in Justice Holmes’s sense—but grounded in equal political representation and universal human dignity. Freedom is not absolute
but subject to limitations necessary to equal general welfare. The right to
free speech is not a stand-alone principle but is linked to the overarching
purpose of deliberative democracy to establish laws likely to achieve liberal equality for the common good.87

87. For an extensive study on how to analyze free speech issues through a contextual
framework, see ALEXANDER TSESIS, CONTEXTUAL FREE SPEECH (forthcoming 2020); Alexander Tsesis, Free Speech Constitutionalism, 2015 ILL. L. REV. 1015 (2015).
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